Great Britain willing to negotiate with Germany on the eve of the war
Memorandum by the State Secretary - London's willingness to negotiate with Berlin on disarmament, economic relation and colonial question
Source: Documents on German Foreign Policy, series D, vol. VI, p.718.
BERLIN, June 13, 1939 e.o. Pol. II 2097
The British Ambassador, who was talking to me today about an alleged currency offence by his German servant, presently turned the conservation to his anxiety as to how we could survive the summer without a conflict. Henderson conducted the conversation as a private one, and did not make it clear where his own views stopped and official ones began. Towards the end, he was unquestionably representing Halifax's views, whereas in the first part of the conversation he expressed criticism of British policy in Warsaw and Moscow. It is well known that for some days the press has been referring to a report by Henderson who is said to wish to expedite the treaty negotiations with Moscow. Without going into this, Henderson made a statement to the following effect: While negotiations between London and Moscow were in progress, a conversation between London and Berlin was of course impossible. Once the Russian pact was concluded, discussions with Berlin should be easier. By this Henderson presumably meant to say something like The Times did, namely, that strength and willingness to negotiate were quite compatible with each other; without strength Britain was perhaps not even a suitable partner for negotiations. On the subject of Britain's pact with Russia, I made a few remarks ridiculing its advantages for Berlin, and a very serious one on its effect in promoting war, particularly in Poland. British policy, I said, was diametrically opposed to Henderson's own thesis, which he had already repeatedly stated in public: "England wants the sea for herself, the continent of Europe can be left to Germany". Instead of this, the fact was that Britain was now undertaking greater and greater commitments on the Continent; for instance, she was allowing the Poles to gamble with her destiny. If there were any logic in British policy at all, the only logic I could see was that England was resolved on a preventive war and was working for it. Henderson reacted very sensitively to this remark. There could be no question whatever of such a will to war. He deplored certain Labour influences: he did not in any way defend the Anglo-Polish Agreement and said that no Runciman would be sent to Warsaw. Neither did he deny Polish unpredictableness or obstinacy. But, as usual, he ascribed the change of front in London to Germany's march into Rump Czechia. In conclusion he reverted once again to the danger period of this summer. From here on, Henderson, obviously acting on instructions, spoke of London's willingness to negotiate with Berlin. Halifax obviously had in mind that the present state of tension could and must be ended by means of discussions. Neither England nor Germany could, or wanted to, bear the burden of rearmament any longer. The ending of the armaments race and the revival of economic relations could be the subject of discussions between London and Berlin. The colonial question could also be discussed. I made no comments on these remarks except to say that something similar had already been brought to my knowledge from London through different channels, but that I could not make anything of such unsubstantiated remarks. It could be deduced from these conversational statements of Henderson's that he is not happy about British relations with the Poles, that he thinks nothing of the Russian pact, and that, for the rest, he is deeply concerned about a possible conflict this summer, for he feels his responsibility as Ambassador in Berlin weighing heavily upon him.
